Three Treaties

Currently, the Obama administration is considering submitting several treaties relating to nuclear weapons to the U.S. Senate. Among other things, these treaties would reduce the number of U.S. nuclear warheads, prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons, and end the production of the plutonium and highly enriched uranium that are nuclear weapons main components. To the extent that we are able to reduce both the amount and allure of these almost incomprehensibly powerful weapons, the case for doing so would seem self-evident. But, opposition to the treaties is already forming, and with significant force. Indeed, if President Obama is able to pass each of the proposed treaties he will have taken a large step towards earning the Nobel Peace Prize he has already received.

Some of the opposition to the treaties is automatic, some of it is predictable, some thoughtful, and some less so. Regardless, the appearance of the treaties presents an opportunity to begin again a vital discussion about U.S. nuclear weapon policy. It was 1961 when President Kennedy told the country that “only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.” As compelling as that point was at the time, in the intervening forty-eight years much has changed. Instead of facing a large, unified country like the Soviet Union, today are enemies are insurgents scattered among the population, in Iraq, and deep in the mountains, in Afghanistan. Even if we desired to use them, if we are can’t locate and terminate the shadowy agents of al-Queda with Predator missiles, the use of nuclear weapons would seem unwise.

And not only is our nuclear arsenal unavailing in our current military conflicts. One only has to scan the headlines to see the instability nuclear weapons create. From Iran’s newly revealed fuel enrichment facility, to North Korea’s cyclical flirtations and rejections regarding its nuclear program, to the increased dangerousness of the simmering conflict between India and Pakistan, nuclear weaponry has a unique ability to create and exacerbate existing problems.

Of course, we should be realistic about what can be accomplished both through American influence and through international treaties. There will always be individuals who will seek whatever is the most destructive power available. That fact makes the question of whether a complete abolition of nuclear weapons is in America’s interest a complicated one—but luckily one that the pending treaties do not raise. Even if we would be less safe with no nuclear weapons it is unclear whether it would be less safe to have 1,500 warheads, as would be required through one of the pending treaties, as opposed to 15,000 or even 150,000. The lesser amount would leave us with a more than a half dozen warheads for every nation on earth, and conflict with Bhutan seems less than imminent.

And neither should we underestimate the good that could come from U.S. leadership. A move to dismantle our nuclear arsenal could send a powerful signal to the world. At the very least, our appeals towards nonproliferation and stockpile reduction in other countries are more likely to be taken seriously if we continue to take significant measures to reduce our own immense reserves. Too often foreign leaders seeking nuclear weaponry are able to channel national pride to support their endeavors. Why, they ask, should America have access to such a large reserve of weapons and while others are restrained? What, they ask, about the military judgment of the United States over the last decade justifies granting them unlimited access to such destructive potential? Ironically, through these and similar protestations America’s enemies are able to take our nuclear arsenal, meant to make us safe, and use it against us as a powerful tool for propaganda.

One common refrain voiced by those who oppose a reduction, in different forms, is that doing so would make America less safe. This, of course, is the vital question. It is always easiest to preserve the status quo, and having a rich supply of weapons—solid, tangible, powerful—is psychologically more comforting than dismantling them in the hope that, at some future point, our world can be rid of these terrible weapons forever. But, to be great, a country must be willing to take risks, and to lead, a country must be willing to expose itself to some the same dangers it expects other countries to face. The question that faces the Senate, and through the Senate the American people, is whether the risks of leadership on this issue are worthwhile. That is a conversation very much worth having.